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Statistical Mechanics of Amplifying Apparatus
by Joseph F. Johnson
Math Dept., Univ. of Notre Dame
Abstract
We consider a toy model of a laser with negative temperature amplification. By passing to a new kind of thermodynamic
limit, involving the renormalisation of Planck’s constant to zero, we obtain a classically describable measurement apparatus. We
introduce a new definition of macroscopic observable which implements Bohr’s insight that the observables of a measurement
apparatus are classical in nature. In particular, we obtain the usual non-abelian observables as limits of abelian, classical,
observables. This insight is made mathematically precise by carrying out Gibbs’s program for Hamiltonian heat baths in our
new context. The method we use has a logical structure identical to that of Ford–Kac–Mazur in classical statistical mechanics.
Wigner’s problem of quantum duality is then solved by deriving the probabilities of measurement results from Schroedinger’s
equation.
Introduction
Wigner1 wrote several fundamental analyses of the problem of quantum measurement, and the formu-
lation of the problem which we adopt here is due to him, he called it the problem of quantum duality. The
deterministic axioms of non-Relativistic Quantum Mechanics, in Dirac’s formulation, assume, to begin with,
that every system is a closed system. To every system is associated a Hilbert space H, and a Hamiltonian
operator H . Every physical state of the system is described by a ray in that Hilbert space, as usual, we fudge
the identifications and consider a non-zero wave function ψ instead of the ray. If the state of the system at
time t = 0 is ψ0, then its state at time t is given by
ψt = e
−itH
h · ψ0 ∈ H.
But there are separate, probabilistic axioms for measurement processes. For every observable, there is
a self-adjoint operator Q on H. If the system in the state ψ undergoes a measurement process associated
to this observable, the only possible results are the eigenvalues {λi} of Q. Assuming that ψ is normalised
and that its Fourier decomposition with respect to the normalised eigenvectors of Q is ψ =
∑
i civi, then
the probability that the result will be λi is |ci|
2. If the result is λi, then the system is, as a result of the
measurement process, in the state given by the wave function vi even though such a transition or jump
(called the reduction of the wave packet) violates Schroedinger’s equation.
On the other hand, the measurement apparatus itself must be a quantum system, possessed of a Hilbert
space Hn to describe its physical states (n is the number of particles in the apparatus) and a Hamiltonian
Hn to govern its time-evolution if it were in isolation. Then the state space of the combined system of the
microscopic, as we will call it, system originally under discussion and which is being measured, and the
macroscopic, as we will call it, measuring apparatus, is Hcomn = H ⊗ Hn and the joint Hamiltonian is the
sum of the two Hamiltonians which would have governed each system in isolation plus an interaction term
(this is almost tautological)
Hcomn = H ⊗ In + I ⊗Hn +H
int
n .
The problem of quantum duality, Wigner1, was that we have two rather different mathematical descrip-
tions of the same physical process and it is not at all clear how to compare them. In the former description,
we are implicitly treating the measurement apparatus as if it were a classical system which did not obey the
superposition principle so that we are sure that the result of the measurement process is always a definite
pointer position, as it is called, a macroscopic pointer visibly and definitely pointing to one or another of the
various possibilities λi. Bohr (as quoted in J. Jauch, E. Wigner and M. Yanase
2) always insisted that the
measurement apparatus had to be classically describable and classical in nature. Heisenberg (cf. J. Bell3)
always insisted that we have to put a cut somewhere, marking off when we use the first three axioms to
analyse things, and when we use the measurement axioms. Von Neumann (as reported in Wigner1) showed
that as long as we do put the cut somewhere eventually, it makes no difference where we put it. Wigner
contributed to this analysis, emphasising that on the classical side of the cut will always be the observer’s
consciousness, at least. So the methodology of introducing a cut used to be considered the solution to the
problem of quantum duality. But this no longer commands a consensus in light of advances in mesoscopic
engineering, detection of quantum mesoscopic chaos, macroscopic superpositions of states, and so on.
Einstein asked the vague but profound question whether or not the probabilities of the latter three
axioms did not arise from some underlying deterministic dynamics in an analogous way to the way they did in
classical statistical mechanics. He seems to have thought that this would mean either revising Schroedinger’s
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equation or perhaps introducing hidden variables. But the logically sophisticated treatment of classical
statistical mechanics due to C. Darwin and R. Fowler4, and extended by A. Khintchine5, does not introduce
hidden variables. For us, the method by which G. Ford, M. Kac and P. Mazur6 carry out the Gibbs program
for the case of harmonic oscillators with a cyclic nearest neighbour interaction is paradigmatic. (J. Lewis and
H. Maassen7 has extended this.) By focussing Einstein’s question on Wigner’s formulation of the problem, we
can answer it positively, taking Schroedinger’s equation as the underlying deterministic dynamics. That is,
we derive the three probabilistic axioms from the three deterministic axioms. We make no other assumptions8
except that we have to introduce some sort of dictionary that compares quantum states with macroscopic
pointer positions, or else the comparison of the first three with the latter three axioms is logically impossible.
Basically, we push the cut out to infinity. No real quantum system is exactly a measurement apparatus, but
the thermodynamic limit of quantum amplifying apparati becomes a classically describable measurement
apparatus which exactly verifies the three probabilistic axioms in the limit as n→∞.
Physically, this model has much in common with aspects of previous work of H. Green9 and A. Daneri,
A. Loinger, and G. Prosperi10. One important physical difference with Coleman—Hepp11 is that the notion
of macroscopic which we will introduce is the opposite of their notion of local observable (which is from
the theory of infinite volume thermodynamic limits, but not physically appropriate here). The idea that
coupling a Brownian mote to a negative temperature amplifier will amplify the motion of the mote from
quantum motion, where observables do not commute, to classical motion, where the non-commutation be-
comes negligible, is perhaps due to J. Schwinger12. Our model is that of a non-demolition measurement,
however, and we assume that the amplifier exerts zero force on the incident particle.
This has mathematical similarities to the literature on the problem which takes the open system ap-
proach. But the physics is different. We make the transition to irreversible classical stochastic dynamics
a function of the coupling between the apparatus and the microscopic system. W. Zurek12 and others14
such as M. Collett, G. Milburn, and D. Walls15 use a sort of open systems approach in that they put the
interaction which is supposed to turn quantum amplitudes into classical probabilities in the coupling with
the environment instead of in the coupling with the amplifier. We assume instead a closed joint system. In
principle, this difference should be detectable by experiment. We also predict that the degree of validity of
the probabilistic axioms should worsen as the size of the amplifying apparatus approaches the mesoscopic
or even microscopic. This should be detectable by experiment as well. The only real novelty is the notion
of macroscopic which we introduce. The need for a precise definition of macroscopic has long been felt.
Indeed, it is not possible to compare the two dual descriptions of the measurement process unless some sort
of dictionary is provided. Von Neumann and Wigner16 (footnote 203) seems to have missed the need for a
relatively sophisticated dictionary, and simply assumed that a macroscopic pointer position corresponded,
more or less approximately in the strong topology on Hn, with a large set of wave functions. It seems
to be this unquestioned assumption which has been the obstacle to progress along Wigner’s original lines.
Abandoning it may mean the abandonment of the ancient dream of psycho-physical parallelism.16
In connection with this I quote P. Dirac17. “And, I think it might turn out that ultimately Einstein
will prove to be right, . . . that it is quite likely that at some future time we may get an improved quantum
mechanics in which there will be a return to determinism and which will, therefore, justify the Einstein point
of view. But such a return to deteminism could only be made at the expense of giving up some other basic
idea which we now asume without question. We would have to pay for it in some way which we cannot
yet [1977] guess at, if we are to re-introduce determinism.” In this regard I wish to point out that there is
almost no credible evidence in favour of the hoary psycho-physical parallelism, and there is a good deal of
evidence for the time-dependent form of Schroedinger’s equation’s being absolutely linear and unitary.
It will be noticed that our physical interpretation, then, is that there are only waves. There are no
particles. The problem of quantum duality, then, becomes the problem of calculating, relatively explicitly,
how it is that the interaction of the wave of, say, a microscopic system with one degree of freedom (called,
sentimentally, an incident particle) interacts with the wave of the amplifiying apparatus to sometimes (with
a definite probability) produce a “particle-event,” i.e., the registering of a loud click on the part of tha
apparatus, and other times, produce no such detection event. Thus the seeming particle-events, the seeming
detection of particles, is an artifact of the amplification process in the interaction of two waves.
Feynman, famously, did not think so, but he did think that perhaps a little more could be said about
the problem of wave-particle duality, “We and our measuring instruments are part of nature and so are, in
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principle, described by an amplitude function satisfying a deterministic equation. Why can we only predict
the probability that a given experiment will lead to a definite result? From what does the uncertainty arise?
Almost without a doubt it arises from the need to amplify the effects of single atomic events to such a level
that they may be readily observed by large systems.”
“. . . In what way is only the probability of a future event accessible to us, whereas the certainty of
a past event can often apparently be asserted?. . .Obviously, we are again involved in the consequences of
the large size of ouselves and of our measuring equipment. The usual separation of observer and observed
which is now needed in analyzing measurements in quantum mechanics should not really be necessary, or
at least should be even more thoroughly analyzed. What seems to be needed is the statistical mechanics of
amplifying apparatus.”18
It is not necessary to think about the philosophical meaning of probability, as A. Sudbery19 remarks,
“It is not in fact possible to give a full definition of probability in elementary physical terms.” “Attempts to
define probability more explicitly than this are usually either circular . . . or mysterious . . .This is not to say
that the question of what probability means, or ought to mean, is not interesting and important; but the
answer to that question, if there is one, will not affect the properties of probability that are set out here, and
we can proceed without examining the concept any further.” All that is necessary is to straightforwardly
imitate the classical methods of statistical mechanics, in a physically appropriate way. Remarkably, the result
we arrive at corresponds exactly to J. von Plato’s philosophically motivated amendment20 of the traditional
frequency theory of probability. The naive frequency theory suffered from grave logical circularities and von
Plato fixed these by incorporating the procedures of classical statistical mechanics. His work has not received
the attention it deserves because he had to rely on the underlying dynamics’ being deterministic, so it was
usually assumed that his purely logical, almost antiquarian concerns, could not be relevant to a quantum
world. This turns out to be a misapprehension.
The Concrete Model
The phenomena of interest can be exhibited with finite-dimensional Hilbert spaces. Let the state space of
an incident particle be C2. We consider that this space has basis ψ0, which means the particle is somewhere
else, and ψ1, which means the particle is present. For each n, Hn is the Hilbert space of wave functions
describing the state space of an n-particle system which is an amplifying device. Since it is a quantum
system, it is not yet exactly a measuring apparatus. It does not become such until the passage to the limit.
We let Hn be the n-fold tensor product of two-dimensional Hilbert spaces with bases |1〉 and |0〉. We write
|1〉 ⊗ |1〉 ⊗ |0〉 = |110〉, for example. Think of this as the state where the first two particles on the left of the
system are in an excited state, and the right-most particle is in a discharged state.
In the presence of an incident particle in the state ψ1, the amplifying apparatus will evolve in time
under the influence of a cyclic nearest-neighbour interaction which is meant to model the idea of stimulated
emission or a domino effect. In the absence of a particle, the dynamics on the amplifying device will be
trivial. We can afford to be so schematic because the behaviour of the thermodynamic limit is extremely
robust with respect to inessential variations in the definitions of the dynamics and interactions. For each
n, we define the Hamiltonian operator Hn which governs the cyclic nearest neighbour interaction on the
amplifying device as follows.
The picture is of n particles in a line. Each one passes on its state to its rightmost neighbour, and the
first one receives its state from the one on the right end (this is the cyclicity). This takes place in time 1
n
. If
|pi1pi2 . . . pin〉 is a typical basis vector, we have that it transforms into |pinpi1 . . . pin−1〉 after
1
n
units of time.
Assume for simplicity that n is prime. Then there are, besides |000 . . . 0〉 and |111 . . .1〉, 2
n
−2
n
(which is an
integer by Fermat’s little theorem) invariant n-dimensional subspaces of Hn for example, one is spanned by
|100 . . .0〉, |010 . . .0〉, and so on. We give the restriction of Hn to any one of these subspaces (they are all
isomorphic). It is a Vandermonde matrix with eigenvalues 0, h, 2h, 3h, . . . , (n− 1)h.
The intuitive picture is that this device is getting more and more classical as n goes to infinity. So the
energy levels get closer and closer, approaching a continuum, the particles get closer and closer which is why
the interaction, at a constant speed, travels from a particle to its neighbour in less and less time, the mass
of each particle decreases as 1
n
, so that we have finite length and fixed density and fixed total energy. We
must, therefore, renormalise, letting h ∝ 1
n
.
We must couple the amplifier to the incident particle. The Hilbert space of the combined system is
Hcomn = C
2⊗Hn =< ψ0 > ⊗Hn⊕ < ψ1 > ⊗Hn. So we need only define H
com
n , the Hamiltonian of the joint
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system, by giving it on the first factor, where it is trivial, and on the second factor, where it is Hn. This is
the explicit toy model of a quantum amplifier, we have now to study the question, what quantities at each
finite stage correspond, in the limit, to a macroscopic pointer position of a classical measurement apparatus?
We need a precise notion of what is a macroscopic system, in terms of the axioms of quantum mechanics,
and what is a macroscopic observable. Although our model owes a great deal to the Coleman–Hepp model,
this notion is the exact opposite of Hepp’s notion of a local observable (which is also the usual one in the
infinite volume thermodynamic limit of Haag, Ruelle, and others21). We wish to implement the intuition
of a function on the phase space which cannot distinguish between states which differ from each other in a
finite or negligible number of spots.
In the classical methods of thermodynamics, one worked essentially with one observable at a time and
there was really a sequence of them for each n. I.e., for each n, one has fn a physically significant phase
function on the space Hcomn , or its classical analogue. And the physical significance is the same as n varies.
It could be total energy of a part of the system, for example the Brownian mote. For us, it could be a
formalisation of some intuitive idea such as, the percentage of excited particles in the left half of the device.
These methods are acutely, if disparagingly, described by R. Minlos21. “For a long time the thermodynamic
limit was understood and used too formally: the mean values of some local variables and some relations
between them used to be calculated in a finite ensemble and then, in the formulas obtained, the limit passage
was carried out.” Excellent agreement with experimental results were obtained that way. At any rate, we
formally define such a sequence of fn to be macroscopic if whenever the sequence of norm one vectors vi ∈ C
2,
i > 0, satisfies
lim
n→∞
fn+no(vo ⊗ vno+1 ⊗ vno+2 ⊗ . . .⊗ vno+n)
exists for some no and some vo ∈ H
com
no
, then it is independent of the choice of no and vo.
We now define the family fn, which in the limit, becomes the pointer position of the measuring apparatus.
There is a basis of Hcomn consisting of separable vectors of the form ψpi0 ⊗ |pi1pi2 . . . pin〉 where, as before, the
pii are 0 or 1. Let C be the set of basis vectors such that all but a negligible number of the pii for i < n/2
are 1 and all but a negligible number of the others are 0. (This is the device being ‘cocked’ and ready to
detect. It is very far from being a stable state, in the limit.) By negligible, we mean that as a proportion of
n, it goes to zero as n increases. For vn any state of the combined system, and we may take vn normalised
of length unity, let ci be the Fourier coefficients of vn with respect to the cocked basis vectors, i.e., those in
C. Define fn(vn) = 1−
∑
i |ci|
2.
Passing to the Thermodynamic Limit: the Ming Effect
Our procedure is modelled on that of Ford–Kac–Mazur, which indeed is modelled on the usual un-
derstanding of the Gibbs program. However, a major physical difference is the renormalisation which we
introduce. Another is that the physical quantity whose limit they study is an autocorrelation; ours is a
macroscopic pointer position. Now we are interested in phenomena in the limit as n approaches ∞, yet
one cannot directly compare a value of fn on a vector vn with fn+1(vn). In keeping with the procedures of
classical statistical mechanics, one compares time or phase averages of the various fn as n varies. (Phase
averages would be taken over the submanifold of accessible states, it is more convenient for us to deal with
time averages. Time averages have been made the basis for von Plato’s theory of the meaning of probability
statements.) Let the incident particle be in the state described by any (normalised) wave function in C2.
Let it be v0 = a0ψ0 + a1ψ1. The amplifier is in the state |111 . . .000〉 in C. We now calculate the limit, as
n approaches ∞, of < fn >, where < fn > means the time average of fn taken over a typical trajectory in
the manifold of accessible states inside of Hcomn .
We will then find a classical dynamical system Ω∞ which has a mixed state X , which depends on v0, and
a classical dynamical variable F whose expectation values match these limits. At any rate, it is elementary
to calculate limn→∞ < fn >, it is |a1|
2. (The microscopic indident particle triggers a domino effect or
macroscopic ‘flash’ which is ‘bright and clear’ i.e., ‘Ming’.)
The procedure of Ford–Kac–Mazur was to consider a dynamical variable fn on each finite system
(classical), M comn . It was the position of the Brownian mote. They then took a kind of phase average of
this, its autocorrelation function, gt,n. (In their original paper, they placed a carefully chosen probability
distribution on the heat bath: it has since been shown that their results are insensitive to the choice of
the mixed state of the heat bath.) They then passed to the limit as n approaches ∞ using a suitable
renormalisation. They then searched for a dynamical system and a stationary Gaussian stochastic process
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on that system which would have as its autocorrelation function this limit. (Furthermore, K. Hannabuss’s
use22 of the Sz. Nagy dilation is in much the same tradition: the dilation is constructed simply from the
correlation functions.) We will carry this out in our setting (but using time averages for convenience).
We search for Ω∞, F , and Xv0 as above, satisfying
∫
Ω∞
FdXv0 = lim
n→∞
< fn > .
Let the state of the (classical limit) measurement apparatus where the pointer position points to cocked (and
hence, an absence of detection) be the point P0. Let the state where the excited states of the apparatus
are proceeding from out of its initial cocked state, and travelling steadily towards the right, be P1. Then
Ω∞ = {P0, P1}. The dynamical variables on this space are generated by the characteristic functions of the
two points, χP0 , χP1 . Let F be χP1 . It is the pointer position which registers detection. The mixed state
of Ω∞ = {P0, P1} which gives the right answer when the incident particle is in state v0 is the probability
distribution which gives P0 the weight |a0|
2, and P1 the weight |a1|
2. This is precisely what it means to say
the the measuring apparatus will register the presence of the particle with probability |a1|
2, and its absence
with probability |a0|
2.
Summary
This answers a famous question of Einstein’s partly affirmatively and partly negatively. It is possible
to derive the probabilities in measurement results from an underlying deterministic dynamics analogously
to the way it was done in classical statistical mechanics of Einstein’s day. It is not necessary to assume
that quantum mechanics is incomplete in order to do this: we may take the wave function as the complete
description of nature and Schroedinger’s equation as exactly and universally valid.
This analysis shows that wave-packet reduction in the strong topology, even approximately, need not
occur. It also shows that the transmutation of quantum amplitudes into classical probabilities depends only
on the macroscopic nature of the pointer position and its coupling to the microscopic system being measured.
It does not depend on any back-force being exerted on the microscopic system. The coupling can be as gentle,
in its effect on the microscopic system, as desired. It suggests that the degree of validity of ‘measurement,’
as an approximation to a physical amplification process, depends on the size of the apparatus. Mesoscopic
amplifiers should, then, demonstrate detectable noise phenomena in comparison to macroscopic amplifiers.
This analysis further shows that it is not necessary to invoke the effect of the environment in order
to construct a logically coherent theory of decoherence. The fact that probabilities arise even from an
amplifier which is in a pure state shows that quantum measurement can be explained without super-selection
rules. Thus the question whether the observed behaviour of measurement processes is due to the coupling
between the apparatus and the microscopic system, or due to the coupling between the apparatus and the
environment23, becomes a question for experiment.
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